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The appellants, pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure, submit this Reply Brief.
INTRODUCTION
In this Reply Brief, the appellants will not simply restate
information contained

in their initial Appellants1

Brief.

The

purpose of this Reply Brief is to address or clarify issues raised
by the appellees in their Brief.

If issues addressed

in the

Appellees' Brief are not directly addressed in this Reply Brief,
the appellants intend to rely on the arguments raised on those
issues in the initial Appellants1 Brief.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is
determinative

of certain

issues on appeal.

governed by case law authority.

Other

issues are

The language of all of these

designated statutes, except Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44, is set out in
the Addendum of the initial Appellants' Brief.

The language of

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 is set out in the Addendum to this Reply
Brief pursuant to Rule 24(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
1.

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

2.

Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 (1989);

3.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2);

4.

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2; and

5.

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Replying to Point I and Point II of Appellees1 Brief)
THE TRAVEL COMPANY CLAIMS ARE NOT
BARRED
BY
THE
UTAH
CORPORATE
DISSOLUTION STATUTE
A point of clarification is necessary.
claims being asserted in this case.
of the Travel Company.
Hatton.

There are two sets of

First are the corporate claims

Second are the individual claims of William

Both sets of claims are based on the same operative facts

and seek the same recovery.

The defendants argue that the Travel

Company claims are barred by the two year corporate dissolution
statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100.

The defendants essentially

deny that William Hatton has an individual claim to pursue and that
any claim of Hatton is derivative only as a shareholder of the
Travel Company.

As such, the defendants argue that Hatton f s claims

are also barred by Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100.
The plaintiffs counter that the Travel Company's claims are
timely brought under the six-year statute of limitation of Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-23(2).

In the alternative, the plaintiffs argue

that the two-year corporate survival statute is not absolute and
may be extended under certain circumstances, which circumstances
should

apply

in this case.

Finally,

regarding

the

corporate

dissolution statute, the plaintiffs argue that that statute does
not apply to postdissolution claims such as these.

2

The issues regarding the corporate dissolution statute are
discussed by the defendants in Points I, II, III, and IV of the
Appellees* Brief.

All other issues go to William Hatton's ability

to pursue this claim individually.
Hatton's

individual

claims

dissolution statute.

are

The plaintiffs argue that

not governed

by

the

corporate

The defendants address Hatton's individual

claims in Point V and VI of their Brief.

Now to the issues.

Replying to Point I and Point II of the Appellees' Brief, the
plaintiffs restate that the six-year limitation
written

contracts

under

Utah

Code

appropriate limitations period.

Ann.

for claims on

78-12-23(2)

is

the

The defendants do not challenge

the plaintiffs' claim that if two statutes of limitations apply to
a claim, the longer statute is preferred.

Juab County Department

of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2.d 49, 146 P.2d 1 (1976);
Woodward v. Chirco Construction, Inc., 141 Ariz. 520, 687 P.2d 1275
(1984).
different

The defendants simply argue that a survival statute is
from a statute of limitations and, therefore, cases

construing different statutes of limitations are not applicable.
The

plaintiffs

difference.

submit

this

as

a

distinction

without

a

The practical effect of a statute of limitations and

a survival statute is to set a specified period of time after which
claims may no longer be brought.

The legal effect of the running

of that limitation period is the same whether it is a statute of
limitations or a survival statute:
3

The plaintiff loses.

The

plaintiffs acknowledge that their research revealed no cases which
specifically addressed the issue of a statute of limitations verses
a survival statute in a situation factually similar to this case.
On the other

hand,

the defendants

have

not

submitted

a case

specifically concluding that where a claim may be governed by a
corporate survival statute and a longer statute of limitations, the
shorter survival statute period automatically applies.
The plaintiff submits that the policy reasons for preferring
the longer statute are present whether the limitation period is
technically
statute.

designated
That

policy

a statute of
is

stated

limitations

in

Safeco

or a survival

Insurance

Co. v.

Honeywell, Inc., 639 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1981):
Statutes prescribing a relatively short period of time
for allowing actions are usually construed narrowly to
the extent necessary to give the holder of the cause of
action a fair opportunity to present his claim. Where
two constructions as to the limitations are possible, the
courts prefer the one which gives the longer period in
which to prosecute the action.
Id. at 1001.
POINT II
(Replying to Appellees' Point III)
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
DICTATE THAT THE TWO-YEAR CORPORATE
DISSOLUTION
LIMITATION,
IF
APPLICABLE, BE EXTENDED
The plaintiffs have cited cases supporting the proposition
that

under

certain

circumstances,

4

the

two-year

limitation

on

corporate survival may be "extended".

Moore v. Nicks Fine Foods,

Inc. , 121 111. App. 2d 923, 460 N.E.2d

(1984).

The "equitable

tolling" discussed by the defendants does not represent the only
circumstances under which the limitation period may be extended.
Cases

cited

by

the

plaintiffs

in

their

initial

Brief

allow

corporate claims to be filed after the corporate dissolution period
if the claims deal with "the prosecution of an action which is
directly related to the process of winding corporate affairs."
Striker v. Chester, 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966).
The Striker court discussed those allowable actions as actions
where "no attempt is being made to continue the corporate business
or to institute a new cause of action", but rather to recover money
or other

property

belonging

to the corporation.

Under

those

circumstances, the Striker court concludes that "the trustees are
not bound by the three-year statutory period of the Michigan law
[corporate dissolution
action. . . . "

statute] and may

id. at 36.

prosecute

the

pending

Contrary to what the defendants state,

the Striker court did cite cases where the actions where initiated
after the corporate dissolution period had passed.

For example, in

John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird, 298 Mich. 662, 299 N.W. 757,
there was a claim for replevin instituted for the repossession of
corporate property, "such claim having been filed more than three

5

years after the corporation's charter had been forfeited."

In that

case, the court did not apply the three-year corporate dissolution
statute to defeat the plaintiff's claim.
The facts in this case are similar.

The plaintiff's seek to

recover under the terms of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory
Note.

There is no attempt to somehow continue the Travel Company

business.

This action is in the nature of winding up of the

corporate affairs and does not violate the purposes behind the
corporate dissolution statute.
In addition to allowing actions in the nature of winding up
corporate affairs, the plaintiffs argue that the statute may be
tolled on equitable principles.

The plaintiffs will not restate

here the equitable principles listed in their initial Brief.
response

to

Point

III

of

the

Appellees'

Brief,

however,

In
the

plaintiffs submit that none of the cases cited by the defendants
specifically concludes that all equitable considerations are barred
in considering whether the corporate dissolution statute may be
tolled.

Each case is specifically limited to its own facts. Koepke

v. First National Bank, 284 N.E.2d. 761 (111. Ct. App. 1972),
simply held that the corporate dissolution statute does apply to
claims brought in equity.

That case did not specifically address

whether, under appropriate circumstances, that limitation period
may be equitably

tolled.

Similarly,

6

in the two Canadian Ace

Brewing

cases

cited

by

the

defendants

simply

stand

for

the

proposition that, in those case, certain specific equitable reasons
for

tolling

a statute,

ie. equitable

estoppel

and

fraudulent

concealment, were not applied in those cases to toll the corporate
dissolution statute.
POINT III
(Replying to Appellees' Point IV)
THE
PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS
ARE
POSTDISSOLUTION CAUSES OF ACTION,
NOT SUBJECT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §1610-100
The plaintiff acknowledges that the distinction between a
predissolution cause of action and a postdissolution
action,

as

it relates

to Utah

addressed in the trial court.

cause of

Code Ann. §16-10-100, was not

This Court's opinion in Hansen v.

Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) addressing that issue, was not filed until July 20, 1993,
over a month after the trial court's Order and Final Judgment in
this case.

Hansen states that "Section 16-10-100 of the Utah Code

places a two year limitation on the time in which a dissolved
corporation can bring a suit for a predissolution cause of action."
Id. at 105.

(Emphasis added).

The defendants spend a lot of time in Point IV of their Brief
discussing representations made in the Hatton Divorce Agreement
attested to on February 9, 1987. The defendants seem to argue that
7

because there were some rumblings about potential litigation back
in February of 1987, before the corporate dissolution of October 1,
1987, any claims of the plaintiffs are predissolution claims.
That's

not

plaintiffs1

true.

The

causes

of

important
action

question

legally

is

"when

accrue?"

That

did

the

is

the

important inquiry both in determining whether a cause of action is
predissolution

or postdissolution

and

in determining

when

any

applicable statute of limitations begins to run out.
It is undisputed that payments under the Promissory Note and
payments under

the Earn Out Provisions of paragraph

3 of the

Purchase Agreement were to be made in installments running through
April 30, 1990.
the

Promissory

(R. 180-82).
Note

and

The $240,704.38 principle balance on
Purchase

Agreement

listed

in

the

plaintiffs1 Complaint was calculated on installment payouts through
April 30, 1990.

That conclusion is supported by the "Disputed

Installments" definition in Appendix 4 of the Appellees' Brief.
Those installments are defined as:
Installments due under the Morris Note which Morris
disputes, said installments falling due beginning on
January 21, 1988, and continuing through April 30, 1990,
in the total approximate principle amount of $241,000.
It is undisputed that the Earn Out Provision of the Purchase
Agreement entitles the plaintiffs to 30% of the amount by which the
Travel Company

revenues during any years exceeding the sum of

$700,000. That earn out provision is to extend "during each of the
8

first five years following the Closing through April 30, 1990."
(R. 180-82).

Accounting is to be undertaken within thirty days at

the end of each quarter of each year to determine the amounts of
such Earn Out Payments.

(R. 180-82).

If a money obligation is payable in installments, a separate
cause of action arises on each installment and the statute of
limitations

begins

to run on each

installment becomes due.

installment

only when

Application of Church, 833 P.2d

that
813

(Colo. App. 1992); Clayton v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 468, 813 P.2d 997
(1991).

The Arizona Court of Appeals has taken that installment

analysis even further, concluding that a cause of action on a
promissory note payable in installments accrues and the statute of
limitations commences running on the date the final installment is
due under the note.

Cheatham v. Sahuaro Collection Service, Inc.,

11 Ariz. Ct. App. 452, 577 P.2d 738 (1978).
Utah

statute provides additional evidence as to when the

plaintiffs' causes of action accrue and the statute of limitations
begins running in this case. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principle or interests shall have been paid, or an
acknowledgement of an existing liability, debt or claim,
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an
action may be brought within the period prescribed for
the same after such payment, acknowledge, or promise. .

9

This Court recently construed that statute and concluded that
it extends the six-year statute of limitations if:

1) P a r t i a l

payment of either principle of interest due under the contract is
made;

2) the payment

is made by the debtor/obligor

under the

contract; and 3) the payment was made to the creditor under the
contract.

Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

It is undisputed that all three elements apply in this case.
Applying those cases and the Utah statute to the facts of this
case, it is undisputed that:
1.

The Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved on October

1, 1987.

(R. 74).

2.

In February of 1988, the defendants made partial payment

to the plaintiffs of $84,295.62 in principle and $8,196.95 in
interest

under

Agreement.
3.

the

terms of

the Promissory

Note

and

Purchase

(R. 111-112).
This action was filed on February 18, 1993.

(R. 2-56).

Under the case law cited above, the filing of this complaint
preserved a claim for all installment payments accruing during the
six years before the filing of the complaint.

That would include

any installment payment due or payable after February 18, 1987.
Under the Cheatham case from Arizona, the plaintiffs' cause of
action on the Promissory Note did not accrue until April 30, 1990,
when the last payment was due.

Therefore, all claims are preserved
10

and all claims are postdissolution causes of action.

Under Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-44, a new six year statute of limitations started
running after the defendants made their February 1988 payment.
That created

a new

six year cause of action

in favor of the

plaintiffs which accrued on the date of the payment, five months
post-corporate dissolution.
Finally, even if the corporate dissolution statute eliminates
predissolution claims, it is clear that only affects causes of
action which accrued before October 1, 1987. Based on the case law
and

statutes

just

cited,

the

plaintiffs

have

significant

postdissolution claims which accrued after October 1, 1987 under
the installment payment, Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement.
The

plaintiffs

acknowledge

that

their

research

has

not

revealed cases which specifically address the application of the
corporate dissolution statute to predissolution claims as opposed
to postdissolution claims.

This Court's opinion in Hansen v.

Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) suggests that there is a distinction between predissolution
and postdissolution claims and how such claims are affected by the
two-year dissolution

statute.

These issues are submitted

clarification in this appeal.

11

for

POINT IV
(Replying to Appellees* Point V)
HATTON HAS AN INDEPENDENT INDIVIDUAL
BASIS UPON WHICH TO PURSUE THIS
CLAIM
A.
Hatton has Adequately Stated His Individual Claim in
the 1993 Complaint and Subsequent Proceedings
The defendants argue that Hatton cannot pursue an individual
claim because he is not a party to the Promissory Note, nor is he
entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase Agreement.
The documents in this case, however, establish other; ise.
It

is

undisputed

that

William

Hatton

was

specifically

designated a separate party to the Purchase Agreement. (R. 119,
133).

William Hatton signed the Purchase Agreement as a separate

party to that document.

(R. 119, 133).

specifically incorporated
which William

The Promissory Note was

as part of the Purchase Agreement to

Hatton was a party.

(R. 137).

Although

the

defendants try to argue that only the form of the Promissory Note
was incorporated as part of the agreement, it is clear that the
Promissory

Note

Agreement,

to

itself

the

was

extent

an

integral

that

the

part

of

installment

the
terms

Purchase
of

the

Promissory Note were specifically included in paragraph 2(c) of the
Purchase Agreement.

(R. 178-179)

12

Being faced with the undisputed fact that William Hatton is a
separate individual party to the Purchase Agreement, the defendants
try to adopt the unique argument that there are certain paragraphs
of the Purchase Agreement to which William Hatton is not a party
and, therefore, as to those specific paragraphs, Hatton has no
enforceable

right.

Understandably,

authority for that position.
contrary

to

paragraph

the

defendants

cite

no

Indeed, that argument is directly

19(b) of

the

Purchase

Agreement

which

provides as follows:
All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon
and inure to the benefit of and shall be enforceable, by
the heirs, executors, administrators, successors, legal
representatives and assigns of buyer, seller, and the
Hattons. (Emphasis Added) (R. 203).
Clearly, an heir, assign, or successor can enforce only those
rights held by the original contracting party.

If Hatton had no

individual right to enforce "all of the terms of the Agreement", or
if all of his rights were solely derivative through the Travel
Company, identifying Hatton individually in that paragraph would be
meaningless.

All

provisions

of

a contract

are deemed

to be

included for a reason and any construction of an agreement which
renders any part of it meaningless should be avoided.

Oregon Bank

v. Nautilus Crane and Eguipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95
(1984).

A contract

is to be

strictly

drafter.

Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1982).
13

construed

against

its

Except

for minor

alterations,

the

lawyers for Morris Travel.

Purchase

Agreement

was

drafted

by

(R. 143-144).

The defendants argue that the allegations in the Complaint
make it clear that Hatton has no individual claim.

They base this

on the language of the Complaint which repeatedly lists the name
The

Travel

allegations.

Company

and

not

William

In this notice pleading

Hatton

in

the

specific

state, such a claim is

unfounded.
There is no dispute that The Travel Company and William Hatton
are

both

Complaint.

listed
In

as

separate

paragraph

3

identifiable
of

the

plaintiffs

Complaint

it

is

in

the

clearly

designated that this action is being brought by William Hatton, as
president of The Travel Company and individually.

(R. 2 ) . At the

end of each cause of action and in the final prayer for relief in
the complaint, it is the plaintiffs,

not the Travel Company alone,

which pray for judgment against the defendants.

(R. 2-56).

In a notice pleading state such as Utah (and Arizona), the
purpose of pleadings is to give notice of opposing claims.

Arizona

Property & Casualty Insurance Guarantee Fund v. Helme, 153 Ariz.
123, 735 P.2d 445 (1986).

The Utah Supreme Court has set out the

notice pleading standard as follows:
The purpose of pleadings is to advise the opponent and
give him an opportunity to meet the issues and the
contentions. If that purpose is served, the requirements
of the law are met.
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975).
14

That standard has been satisfied in this case. Pleadings need
only serve notice of the claim asserted and need not express a
complete recitation of all facts which support a claim for relief.
Eliminator, Inc. v. 4700 Holly Corp., 681 P.2d
1984).

536 (Colo. App.

It is clear from the face of the pleadings that William

Hatton is asserting an individual right to proceeds under the
Purchase Agreement.
notice

of

Hattonfs

That allegation alone put the defendants on
individual

claim

and

lead

to

further

proceedings, including the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Had the defendants felt that the was complaint insufficiently pled
to a point that they could
pleading,

they

had

not reasonably

the option

of moving

frame a responsive

for

a more

definite

statement under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants did not file such a motion and this case moved
forward with the filing of memoranda on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
It is clear from the above argument that, under Utah's notice
pleading requirements, the plaintiff has sufficiently raised his
individual claim in this case.

Even if it were deemed that the

pleadings did not sufficiently raise Hatton's individual claim,
that issue has been preserved pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part as
follows:
15

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the underlying purpose
of this Rule 15(b) is that judgment should be granted in accordance
with law and evidence as the ends of justice require, whether the
pleadings are actually amended or not.

First Security Bank v.

Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859 (Utah 1979).

Where a defendant

has ample opportunity to present contrary evidence and does not
object to the plaintiff's evidence on the ground that it was not
within the issues of the case, the defendant cannot complain of a
record conforming to that evidence.

Draper v. J.B.& R.E. Walker,

Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 260 (1952).
The parties fully briefed and argued the issues regarding
William Hatton's individual right to pursue these claims.
substantive legal issues included the issues on appeal:

Those

the fact

that Hatton was in direct contractual privity with the defendants,
Hatton's ability to pursue the individual claim as a stockholder in
whom

the assets

of the dissolved

corporation

had vested,

and

Hatton's ability to pursue the individual claim as a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement between Morris Travel and the Travel
Company.

These issues were fully briefed and argued by the parties

in the trial court.

As such, under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, the evidence in this case incorporates all of
those substantive arguments.
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The
William

appellants
Hatton's

will not

individual

restate
claims

their

as

a

argument

regarding

third-party

creditor

beneficiary of the Promissory Note between Morris Travel and the
Travel Company.
Wanda

Hatton

parties.

The intent to confer a benefit on William and

was

The

clear

from

the

negotiating

Hattons

were

the

sole

position

shareholders

of

the

and

only

individuals to receive payment under the terms of the Note.

Just

as a corporation can only act through its employees, benefits
received by a corporation, in this case the payments received by
the Travel Company under the Promissory Note, can only be received
by shareholders of the corporation.

The defendants' argument that

nothing in the Purchase Agreement or Promissory Note demonstrates
an intent to confer any benefit on William Hatton ignores the
reality of the contracting situation.
B. The Hatton divorce documents and the 1988 complaint
do not preclude the assertion of Hatton's individual
claim.
To undermine Hatton's ability to pursue an individual claim,
the defendants argue that the Hatton divorce documents, as well as
the previously-filed 1988 complaint confirm that these are Travel
Company claims only.

It is true that much of the language in the

divorce documentation and the language of the 1988 complaint talk
of

"The Travel Company".

That, in itself, doesn't mean that

William Hatton does not have an individual right to pursue those
17

claims.

Simply because rights to pursue a claim exist in one party

does not preclude the same rights in other parties.
happens all the time in the law.

That situation

For example, a driver and

passenger in a car may be rear-ended by a negligent defendant.

The

driver may file a complaint against the defendant without the
passenger being a party to that action.

The driver/plaintiff may,

for whatever reason, dismiss without prejudice the
complaint.
as

first-filed

The driver and passenger may then refile the complaint

co-plaintiffs

against

the

defendant.

In

that

case,

the

defendant would not be able to argue in the second action that,
simply because the passenger was not a party to the first action,
the passenger did not have a legitimate negligence claim.
essence, that's what the defendants in this case are saying.

In
Just

because Hatton's individual claim was not specifically included in
those previous proceedings does not mean that his claim does not
exist or cannot be asserted.
the

substantive

defendants'

law

focus

on

to

be

these

Whether that claim exists is based on
addressed
procedural

on

this

issues

appeal.
provides

The
little

assistance and detracts from the substantive legal issues to be
decided.
POINT V
(Replying to Appellees' Point VI)
HATTON IS ENTITLED TO PURSUE THIS
CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER OF
THE
TRAVEL
COMPANY
ASSETS.
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REGARDLESS, HATTON CAN PURSUE THIS
INDIVIDUAL CLAIM BECAUSE HE IS IN
DIRECT CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY WITH THE
DEFENDANTS.
The plaintiff will not restate its argument in Point IV. B. of
its initial Brief regarding Hatton's ability to pursue this case as
a successor shareholder of the Travel Company.

The plaintiffs

believe that the cases cited in that section of their initial Brief
support Hatton pursuing this claim as a successor shareholder, even
after the two-year corporate dissolution statute expired.
Lieblinq, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956).
to

restate

his

position,

Levy v.

Hatton does, however, want

conspicuously

not

addressed

by

the

defendants in their Brief, that a shareholder can sue for breach of
contract on any contract to which he is a party.

This is an

exception to the general rule that a shareholder has no individual
cause of action for injuries sustained by the corporation.

This

was clarified by the Alaska Supreme Court in Hikita v. Nichiro
Gvoqyo Kiasha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986):
We hold that a shareholder can sue for breach of contract
to which he is a party, even if he has not suffered an
injury separate and distinct from that suffered by other
shareholders. . . .
Id. at 1200.
CONCLUSION
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is the sixyear limitation of Utah Code Ann. §78-12-23(2), not the two-year
corporate dissolution statute of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100.
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For

policy purposes, there is no distinction between a statute of
limitations

and

a

survival

statute.

Further,

that

two-year

limitation only applies to predissolution causes of action, not the
plaintiffs' postdissolution causes of action here.

Even if the

two-year limitation period applies, that limitation period should
be extended

under the facts of this case to allow winding up

activity and for equitable reasons.
Regardless of this Court's conclusions regarding the claims of
the Travel

Company,

William

Hatton

is entitled

individual claims against the defendants.

to pursue

his

Hatton is a named party

to the Purchase Agreement and in direct contractual privity with
the defendants.

Hatton is also allowed to pursue this individual

claim because the assets of the Travel Company passed to him on
dissolution.

Finally, Hatton is a clear third party creditor

beneficiary of the Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note.
For these reasons, the trial court erred
defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment.

in granting

The

trial

the

court's

conclusions and order and judgment should be reversed and this case
should be remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.
Dated this

^ c/ \

day of June, 1994.
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C.

GORDON K. JENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Dennis R. James
Of Counsel
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Appellees
240 East Morris Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3200
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ADDENDUM

78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise
to pay.
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest
shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or
claim, or any promise I o pay the same, shall have been made, an action may
be brought within tho period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is
barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be unavailable either as a
cause of action or ground of defense.

